Apropos of such disturbances of the national equanimity as the New Orleans lynching affair or the Behring Sea difficulty occasioned, the subject of international relations becomes one of sudden and special interest to the general public. Of all the multitudinous problems that confront the present generation the war problem has been, perhaps, the slowest to awaken popular feeling to anything like rebellion against warfare and its consequences.

The speculations of theorists have been confined in their influence to very narrow circles; and the possibility of the abolition of war and of the downfall of the standing army has scarcely dawned upon the world at large.

The experiences of recent years, however, have here and there afforded opportunities for theories of peaceful arbitrament to be put to the test of practice; and the time cannot be far distant when public opinion will be called upon to declare the final verdict of success or failure for international arbitration as a working system.

I have spoken of arbitration as if it were a modern institution. By this I do not mean to imply that the custom of referring disputed questions to a disinterested judge—and this may be taken as a loose definition of arbitration—was unheard of before this century. It is not an innovation of recent date, nor is it to be regarded purely as an outgrowth of advanced civilization. But, even granting that the scheme of settling international quarrels by rational means instead of by force may be, to a certain extent, indebted for its conception to precedents in antiquity, international arbitration as a system, as a proposed substitute for war, is an experiment of the present age.

As it is understood to-day, international arbitration is limited in meaning, implying: (1) the participation of

sovereign states of acknowledged independence and autonomy; (2) a formal agreement on the part of the litigants to submit their difficulties to the decision of an arbitrating body or individual; (3) the consent of the latter to undertake such decision and to render an award after a thorough and impartial examination of the facts of the case; (4) an agreement on the part of the contracting parties to accept the decision as final and conclusive.*

Before passing to the application of pacific principles to international relations in the present century, it may be well to review briefly the changes which the last nineteen hundred years have witnessed in the attitude of civilized nations towards war, and which have resulted in the definite formulation of the institution defined above.

The Christian religion, as taught and practiced by its founder and His disciples, placed especial emphasis on the principles of brotherly love, forbearance, forgiveness of enemies, and peace and good-will towards all men—theories of life and of human intercourse quite strange to the civilizations of the pre-Christian era. All the records of the early Church which have come down to us of the first two centuries of its existence would seem to show that the inconsistency of warfare with the tenets of the new religion had made a strong impression upon the sect. There is a saying current among the early Fathers that Jesus, in disarming Peter, disarmed all soldiers; and it is a remarkable fact that so large a number of Christians refused to serve in the armies of Rome.

It is to be remembered, however, that comparatively few individuals experienced anything like "conversion" in the sense of a readjustment of themselves to a new standard of life and thought. When whole armies were converted *en masse*, as in the days of Clovis, there seems to have been no question of exchanging their arms for the weapons of spiritual warfare. It was the Church as an organization that,

* It is this last feature that distinguishes arbitration from mediation, in which adherence to the decision is optional.

throughout the Middle Ages, uttered the sole remonstrance against the practice of private war. When, in France, the atrocities of feudal warfare became so great as to threaten the very foundations of society, it was the Church that came to the rescue with the "Peace of God;" and five years later, the "Truce of God," by which fighting was forbidden from Thursday morning to Monday morning of every week, on all feast-days and in Lent, leaving, practically, about eighty days in the year when war was allowable. Though often violated, the effect of this regulation was felt throughout Europe and was productive of infinite good in softening the manners of the age. The early Church and the institution of chivalry were the educators of the public conscience in the direction of humane and conciliatory action.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries numerous associations were formed which were the prototypes, on a small scale, of modern Peace Societies. There was not as yet, however, any conception of international peace—the word international could hardly have had any meaning. By the time that the spirit of nationality had begun to assert itself, *i. e.* when there had begun to be a distinct differentiation of the several small nations of Europe in respect to language, institutions and political interests, schemes of universal peace and of a united Christian state had become dreams of the past. The Church was in despair, though still zealous for peace.

To the Pope, the head of the Church, the world looked for judgment in political quarrels. Although the sacredness of their high position would seem to have peculiarly fitted them for the position of universal arbiters, the Popes lacked one indispensable qualification of an umpire—impartiality. Nor were the temporal heads of Christendom—the theoretical "*imperatores pacifici*"—more successful. Never in any real sense did the Holy Roman Emperors occupy their ideal position as international dictators.

Mediæval methods of grappling with the war-problem ended, then, in practical failure; and the cause of universal

peace was forgotten in the horrors of the Inquisition and the blood-thirsty wars of the Reformation. The conception of Henry IV, of France, of a grand Christian Republic of fifteen states, and his scheme of international arbitration were too far in advance of his time not to have been regarded either as the dreams of a visionary fanatic or as a subtle attempt at the aggrandizement of France. More valuable and far more important was the work of Hugo Grotius, who, while a guest at Henry's Court, received the inspiration to his great work, "*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*," in which he laid the foundation of a system of international law.

Here it will be observed that the character of the peace movement has changed. It is no longer religious, but political, in its aims. Efforts towards reconciliation no longer originate with the Church, but with monarchs and statesmen; they take the form, in general, of alliances of the great powers of Europe for the purpose of preserving peace among themselves, and thus, by the latent strength of unity and numbers, preventing the possibility of attack by ambitious and grasping rivals. Experience showed the delusiveness of such a theory.

The magnificent promises of the "balance-of-power" system failed of accomplishment. Instead, war after war was waged in the name of the general security.

The opening of the nineteenth century brought with it a return to the religious point of view, and to the primitive notion that Christianity is the basis of all international law. Europe entered upon the century worn out with conflict and in desperate need of peace. Russia, Austria and Prussia accordingly, in 1815, formed what is known as the Holy Alliance, agreeing by a sacred compact to respect the great principles of right and justice, and to repress violence—promises which fell far short of fulfillment.

In 1818, at the Conference held at Aix-la-Chapelle, the four nations that had conquered Napoleon, joined later by France, formed themselves into the Great Pentarchy, in the interests of permanent peace. The dangerous principle

of intervention was unanimously recognized, and the outcome was the Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona.

The Holy Alliance forms a link between the peace policy of the past and that of the present. The unsatisfactory results of the Grand Alliance dealt the death-blow to the theory of the balance of power as an efficient and practicable system. Henceforth all efforts toward amicable adjustment of international affairs are to be based upon other principles.

The work of the nineteenth century in view of this end takes on three forms:

1. The organization and work of peace conferences and associations for the promotion of arbitration.
2. Legislation favoring arbitration.
3. The practical application of the principle.

Peace societies began to be established early in the century, the first having been organized in New York in 1815. Six months later the London Peace Society was formed. Similar organizations sprang up all over Europe. Their object was to unite all the advocates of peace for concerted action.

Conferences have been held from time to time at London, Brussels, Geneva, Paris, and elsewhere, for the interchange of sympathy and the discussion of plans.

About 1873, efforts were made to bring the subject of arbitration before the legislative bodies of the different countries. A motion of the late Mr. Henry Richard passed the House of Commons, in 1873, proposing that England should communicate with foreign powers with a view to the improvement of international law and the establishment of a permanent system of arbitration.

Signor Mancini presented a similar resolution to the Italian Parliament in the same year. From time to time petitions and memorials have been presented to the various governments of Europe and the Americas. Work of this character is necessarily slow and cautious, working, like leaven, silently, but effectively.

More attractive to the practical observer is the record of actual cases of settlement by arbitration during the present

century. Their number is surprising. I have carefully examined the records of seventy-five cases and there are a half dozen more of which I have hitherto been unable to find more than a statement of the dates and participants.*

The questions which have proved susceptible of arbitration fall under five main heads:

1. Boundary disputes.
2. Unlawful seizure of vessels or other property.
3. Claims for damage by the destruction of life or property.
4. Disputed possession of territory.
5. The interpretation of treaties.

More than one-third of the cases have related to claims for damages presented, usually, by one government in behalf of certain of its citizens resident in the country of the offending government. Such questions, although occasionally of such a character as to lead to heated controversy and menacing dispatches, have been for the most part, amicably settled to the satisfaction of all parties.

In sixteen cases boundary lines have been the subject of dispute. The instances of misinterpretation of treaty stipulations have usually referred to boundaries. Questions of this nature are particularly adapted to handling by commissions, provided such bodies are properly constituted and authoritative.

Eleven cases of unlawful seizure and five controversies over territorial possession have been successfully arbitrated. One or two minor cases relate to consular rights and disputed sovereignty.

The rate of increase in the application of arbitration may be seen from the following table:

From	1794	to 1820	5	cases.
"	1820	" 1830	3	"
"	1830	" 1840	5	"
"	1840	" 1850	4	"
"	1850	" 1860	10	"
"	1860	" 1870	15	"
"	1870	" 1880	16	"
"	1880	" 1890	21	"
		Total	79	

* For cases of arbitration between the United States and other governments, see Appendix.

This list does not include the Danubian Commission, established in 1856, the Berlin Congress of 1878 (to settle claims of States in the Balkan Peninsula), nor the Joint Commission on the Fisheries question that met at Washington in 1888 and recommended the submission of future disputes on that question to a mixed commission and an umpire.

The most noteworthy cases of arbitration are two or three of special character, which hardly come under the five heads mentioned above.

The first is the Luxembourg question, which was settled in 1867. The jealousy manifested by France towards Prussia during the peace negotiations which terminated the Austro-Prussian war found expression in Napoleon's demands for territorial recompense to reconcile France to the changes in Europe effected by the Peace of Prague. Prussia was now in possession of military strength equal to that of France herself; and her recent exploits and successes were looked upon by France as the precursors of efforts towards self-aggrandizement. Napoleon's eye fell upon the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which was under the sovereignty of the King of Holland, but a member of the German Confederation until the dissolution of the latter in 1866. The fortress of Luxembourg was still occupied by Prussian troops. The negotiations begun by Napoleon with the King of Holland for the annexation of the duchy to France failed on account of the objection of Prussia. Whereupon France demanded the evacuation of the fortress by Prussia. A warm dispute ensued, and, as the excitement spread through Europe, the outbreak of a war seemed inevitable. The Queen of England, however, offered her services as arbitrator, in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty of Paris, 1856.

It was finally agreed that the question be settled by a conference of the great powers of Europe. This conference met at London, May, 11, 1867, and decided that the fortress should be dismantled and its neutrality guaranteed by the

signatories of the Treaty of Paris. The duchy became the property of the House of Orange. War was averted for three years only: the jealousy of France found its outlet in the Franco-Prussian war.

A rebellion of the island of Crete (then under the rule of the Turks) occurring in the same year resulted in an uninterrupted struggle of two years. The great Powers of Europe pursued, for the most part, a policy of non-intervention. But Greece manifested a friendly interest in her neighbor's welfare, and some sympathy with the cause of the oppressed Cretans. Incensed at what was deemed the instigation of Turkish subjects to revolt, the Porte launched at Greece an ultimatum charging her with aiding and abetting the rebellion. The Greek Minister replied haughtily, and diplomatic relations were broken off. A threatened engagement between a Turkish and a Greek vessel was prevented by the French Minister in Greece, but the incident brought matters to a crisis, and roused the attention of all Europe.

The Prussian Government proposed to France to call a conference of the Powers at London. After much diplomatic correspondence, the plan was adopted, and the conference met January 9, 1869; but it barely escaped disintegration at the outset. Turkey, as a signatory of the Treaty of Paris, was admitted with deliberative powers. Greece claimed the same privilege, but was refused in spite of indignant remonstrance. After several sessions, a declaration was drawn up in favor of Turkey.

This conference has been variously judged, some blaming its members for assuming the functions of judges when they had merely been invited to deliberate and advise; others praising with much warmth the work of the conference in averting a war which might have involved all the powers of Europe. Both criticisms are just in part. This much may be safely said: although its results were important, the conference can hardly be held up as the type of a well-managed commission of arbitration.

The circumstances which led to the famous "Alabama"

case are too familiar to need rehearsal here. The apathy of Great Britain towards the depredations of the Confederate cruiser gave great offense to the United States Government, which pronounced England responsible for all these acts and guilty of a breach of neutrality. Diplomatic correspondence became more and more bitter, complicating, rather than clearing up the matter. After four years of wearisome, fruitless negotiation, settlement by a Joint Commission was suggested by Mr. Reverdy-Johnson. The proposition was accepted by the British Minister, but failed to pass the United States Senate. The conditions of the protocol were pronounced insufficient to secure just reparation to the United States. It was probably only the strong aversion of both the litigants to war that prevented an outbreak. When, in 1871, it was finally agreed to submit the vexed question to arbitration, owing to the insufficiency and vagueness of international laws, much time was wasted in the discussion of legal points.

That the temper of two nations so high-spirited as Great Britain and the United States stood the test of a long and irritating negotiation until the vexed question was finally settled is worthy of high commendation. These three arbitrations, involving as they do questions of national honor, are instructive precedents.

It is difficult to analyze the present situation of the world with reference to peace and war. The history-making events of to-day will not be perfectly understood until they have been looked at in perspective. In spite of the progress of arbitration during the last half century, in spite of the mitigation of many of the cruelties of war, Europe bristles with the bayonets of enormous standing armies and seems ever on the verge of a horrible conflict. How are such opposite tendencies to be reconciled? What is to become of the peace movement if Europe continues to cling to her military systems, justifying their enormous expense by the old motto, "*Si vis pacem, para bellum?*"

To venture an opinion one must have carefully studied the

general trend of social evolution. The character of warfare and its causes has greatly changed. The brutal struggle for self-preservation is no more. Wars of conquest belong to the days of Cæsar and Alexander. Wars undertaken for the gratification of personal ambition have been hardly possible since the first Napoleon. With the change from unlimited to constitutional monarchy, the people have too strong a voice to allow a war to be undertaken merely for the aggrandizement of an ambitious monarch—the populace of to-day does not clamor for war, unless under strong provocation.

Broadly speaking, we may infer that wars arising from trivial disputes tend to become less and less frequent. On the other hand, the great underlying causes of strife tend to become fewer, but far more deep-seated, reaching to the very vitals of national life.

The great problem of race individuality is closely interwoven with the war problem. Since the death of Charles the Great, the personality of each of the European nations has developed in lines ever diverging, ever more distinct. To-day, the controversy over Alsace-Lorraine is not merely one of disputed territorial ownership, but a race question—a struggle between the national wills of two powerful races. The eastern question is purely one of race. Says M. De Laveleye: "Nationalities supposed to have been annihilated rise like dead men, aspiring to independent and autonomous life." The spark of national vitality is not easily quenched. Should a war break out to-morrow in Europe, it would be without precedent in history for horrible waste and destruction of life.

Whether war will finally vanish from off the face of the earth no man can tell. It seems probable that conflicts will become fewer and more intense; but not until the deep-lying causes of strife are removed will the evil be banished forever. If this comes to pass, it will be when the onward march of civilization and the spread of Christianity shall have adjusted to their proper places the shifting molecules

of the great race unit and shall have brought them into a state of perfect equilibrium. In the meantime, what is to be the fate of arbitration?

The success of arbitration in the past is due to various causes:—improvement in the condition of international law; increased educational facilities for fostering pacific sentiments in the minds of the people; progress in the art of diplomacy, and, most important of all, the growth of democratic ideas leading to the participation of the people in questions of peace and war.

Fifteen years ago much was said about the establishment of an International Tribunal or of a Court of Arbitration. According to recent reports of the Peace Associations, the present aim of the movement is to persuade the nations to sign arbitration treaties. The resolution adopted by the International Parliamentary Conference, at its recent session in London, reads as follows: "*Resolved*, That as a means of promoting peace and good-will between nations, the members urge the conclusion of treaties of arbitration by which, without interference with their independence or autonomy, nations would engage to submit to arbitration the settlement of all differences which might arise between them. But where the conclusion of treaties of arbitration for the present be found difficult of realization, the conference strenuously urges the settlement of disputes by arbitration or mediation."

This proposition apparently meets with more approval than that of an International Tribunal, and would naturally precede the formation of such a body. If arbitration is tried *before* resorting to war, the number of unnecessary and unjustifiable wars will be greatly diminished. Arbitration should be spoken of not as a substitute for war, but as a preventative.

The most serious obstacle to the introduction of international arbitration as a permanent institution has been the indecision of its advocates as to the method of conducting cases. Hitherto, three methods of arbitration have been employed: First, reference to some trustworthy and disinter-

ested individual. This is the least advisable plan of all, for it is usually difficult to find a person who will be satisfactory to the litigants and who will be willing to undertake so delicate a task. Moreover, in the case of disputed boundary lines or claims for indemnity, the labor of investigating records would usually be quite beyond the strength of one man.

The second method, adopted in certain cases, is that of settlement by a conference of diplomats representing the governments concerned. Such a body is unwieldy, and necessitates a large expenditure of time and money for preliminary negotiations.

The most popular and successful plan has been the appointment of a mixed commission, small enough to be easily managed, large enough to work rapidly and systematically, unhampered by diplomatic "red tape." Still, such a commission is temporary—unsuited to a scheme of permanent arbitration. The Halifax Fisheries Commission of 1871 illustrates another objection. The question at issue was to be decided by a commission of arbitration. The clause in the Treaty of Washington admitting the possibility that the choice of umpire of the commission be left to the Austrian Minister at London was very annoying to the United States. The suspicion of unfairness and partiality, whether well founded or not, was the cause of considerable irritation. The final award of the commission was a surprise to the world. By Americans it was considered excessive and exorbitant, and many doubted if it were lawfully and honorably due. The United States promptly paid the money; but as a case of arbitration this was, perhaps, the most unsuccessful on record, and greatly shook the public confidence in the efficacy of that method of adjusting differences.

A permanent mixed tribunal would insure impartiality. Such a scheme would imply the abolition of standing armies or a uniform reduction in their numbers. The question has been raised by doubters, How will such a tribunal be able

to enforce its decisions if the army is banished? Some have suggested that each nation furnish its quota of soldiers to form a kind of international police. Such an institution, however, would seem an inconsistency, if a tribunal aiming to substitute reason and justice for the sword and bayonet be obliged to use force in the execution of its decrees.

There is, apparently, some confusion in the public mind, between an International Court and a permanent Commission of Arbitration. The former should mean a Court of International Law, and, to be effective, should be composed of the most eminent jurists and statesmen of whom the world can boast, men who know the laws of nations as they now exist and who are capable of interpreting and codifying those laws. There is urgent need of a complete and precise code of international law. Much dispute and misunderstanding is the consequence of the imperfection of the present code. "The great end of law is not to decide, but to prevent disputes."

A court of international law would find its authority in the majesty of the law, and the moral support of the nations ought to be a sufficient guarantee for the acceptance of its decrees. Any government which refused to abide by the decisions of so august a body would suffer eternal disgrace in the eyes of the world, to say nothing of the material loss of commercial good-will. The expense of such a court, shared by the participating nations, would be comparatively light.

When a dispute arose the plaintiff would at once carry the case to this great Court of Appeals, which would investigate the said case on a purely legal basis. This would take the place of special arbitration, but should any question not susceptible of legal interpretation arise, a Commission of Arbitration could easily be formed from the panel of the international jury.

There might still remain a few great questions incapable of pacific solution until the moral consciousness of the nations become much more highly developed than they are to-day.

Is there no solution but the standing army? The question is largely economic in character and its discussion would occupy a much larger space than can be spared here.

The peace question is only one of the many tangled problems with which this generation has to deal. It may not be solved by the next generation, nor the next. Whatever is done, the world looks to America for leadership. "Nothing impressed the delegates sent from the United States to the late Peace Congress at Paris more seriously," says the Secretary of the American Peace Society in his annual report, "than the sentiments of various European countries that it is the duty of the Great Republic of the West not only to keep abreast with the world's endeavor to abolish war, but to *lead* the nations in the better way of Universal Peace."

APPENDIX.*

LIST OF TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN POWERS, WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS BY ARBITRATION.

1. 1794, November 19.—Great Britain and United States. (1) Question of Northeastern boundary line of United States; (2) Claims growing out of the Revolutionary War. Settled by Commission of Arbitration.
2. 1803, April 30.—France and United States. Claims connected with cession of Louisiana. C. of A.†
3. 1814.—Great Britain and United States. Treaty of Ghent provided for settlement of claims to certain islands; also North-west boundary. C. of A.
4. 1818.—December 21. Spain and United States. Indemnification for damages.
5. 1819.—February 22. Spain and United States. Claims for damages. C. of A.

* The authorities for this list are:
(1.) "Treaties and Conventions of United States."
(2.) "Foreign Relations of United States."
(3.) "British and Foreign State Papers."

† Abbreviation for Commission of Arbitration.

6. 1818.—1822.— Great Britain and United States. Convention signed October 20, 1818, to refer dispute about restoration of territories, private property, archives, etc., to Emperor of Russia. Award rendered in 1822. New Convention provides for Commission of Arbitration to determine valuation of property (slaves).
7. 1827.—North-east boundary not having been yet settled, Convention signed to refer question to King of Netherlands.
8. 1830.—June 5. Denmark and United States. Claims of citizens relating to damages and unlawful seizures. C. of A.
9. 1832.—United States and the Two Sicilies. Claims for indemnification. C. of A.
10. 1834.—United States and Spain. Decision of claims to be left to Plenipotentiaries of the two governments.
11. 1839.—United States and Mexico. Claims of United States citizens against government of Mexico. C. of A. In case of disagreement of the Commissioners, the King of Prussia to be invited to arbitrate in person or provide a substitute.
12. 1841.—United States and Peru. Claims of United States citizens against Peru. C. of A.
13. 1846.—June 15. United States and Great Britain. Dispute regarding boundary-line west of Rocky Mountains, referred to James Buchanan and the Rt. Hon. Richard Parkenham, "negotiators, with full power."
14. 1850.—United States and Brazil. Questions arising from long-pending claims, to be settled by a commission of two.
15. 1851.—United States and Portugal. Claims of United States citizens, to be referred to Daniel Webster and J. C. de Figanière è Morao, Plenipotentiaries. Questions of public law involved in case of the privateer brig "Gen. Armstrong," to be referred to arbitration of Louis Napoleon.
16. 1853.—United States and Great Britain. Old claims of citizens of United States and of Great Britain. C. of A.
17. 1855.—United States and Great Britain. Question relating to Darien Ship Canal. [Correspondence relating to the arbitration of this question is to be found in "British and Foreign State Papers" for 1855–56. I have been unable to ascertain whether the arbitration actually took place.]
18. 1857.—United States and New Granada. Claims of United States citizens for damages sustained in Panama riot of 1856.
19. 1858.—United States and Chili. "Macedonian claims," submitted to decision of King of the Belgians.
20. 1859.—United States and Paraguay. Claims of United States citizens. C. of A.

21. 1860. United States and Costa Rica. Claims of United States citizens. C. of A.
22. 1861.—United States and Venezuela. Claims of certain firms in the United States, referred to United States Minister at Venezuela and Secretary of State of Venezuela.
23. 1862.—United States and Ecuador. Claims of United States citizens. C. of A.
24. 1862.—Article I of Annex B to Treaty between United States and Great Britain for the suppression of African Slave Trade contains a clause providing for reference of all cases of capture or destruction of vessels to arbitration.
25. 1863.—United States and Peru. Claims relating to ships "Lizzie Thomson" and "Georgiana," to be arbitrated by King of the Belgians.
26. 1863.—United States and Great Britain. Claims of Hudson's Bay and Puget Sound Agricultural Companies, referred to C. of A. Award not rendered till September 10, 1869.
27. 1866.—United States and Venezuela. Pending claims. C. of A.
28. 1868.—United States and Mexico. Claims since 1814. C. of A.
29. 1868.—United States and Peru. Arbitration of claims since 1863.
30. 1869.—United States and Peru. I find doubtful references to some question, apparently other than the above (29), submitted to the arbitration of King of the Belgians.
31. 1870.—United States and Brazil. Case mentioned in a "Memorial" presented to Congress in 1888. Not found in "Treaties and Conventions of United States."
32. 1871.—February 11th. United States and Spain. The "Cuba claims." C. of A.
33. 1871.—United States and Great Britain. "Alabama" claims. Geneva Arbitration.
34. 1871.—May 8. United States and Great Britain. Sundry claims of citizens, corporations, etc., during years 1861–65, submitted to arbitration.
35. 1871.—United States and Great Britain. Nova Scotia Fisheries. C. of A. Dispute about fishing rights and about amount of compensation, if any, due to Great Britain from United States.
36. 1872.—October 21. United States and Great Britain. Boundary question, known as the San Juan dispute; referred to Emperor of Germany.
37. 1879.—United States and Spain. All claims since October 1, 1868, not yet settled, to be presented within sixty days to a Commission of Arbitration.
38. 1880.—United States and France. Claims of citizens for acts

committed during war of France with Mexico or during the Insurrection of the Commune in 1870–71. C. of A.

39. 1884.—The United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain and Italy made an agreement for the adjustment of claims of citizens of those countries for losses sustained during the riots of 1883, September 22 and 23, at Port au Prince. [Foreign Relations of United States for 1884, page 302.]
40. 1885.—United States and Spain. Agreement to submit claims of bark "Masonic," illegally seized by authorities at Manilla, 1879, to arbitration, in order to fix amount of indemnity.
41. 1888.—December 6. United States and Denmark. Claims of Carlos Butterfield & Co. for attack on their vessels by Danish officials, to be settled by the British Ambassador at Athens.
42. 1889.—June 4. United States and Venezuela. Provision for claims under Treaty of April 25, 1886.
43. 1889.—United States, Great Britain and Germany. The Samoan difficulty.

ELEANOR L. LORD.

Smith College.